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with the debtor.3 The amendments were implemented to “put in place ‘a set of challenging
standards’ and ‘high hurdles’ for debtors to overcome before retention bonuses could be paid.” 4
The amendments narrowed the circumstances in which KERP payments could be made and
limited the amount of the KERP payments. 5
Following the BAPCPA amendments, many debtors have been faced with the question of
when the Bankruptcy Court will approve the proposed KERP. The answer is highly dependent
on whether the employee is an insider of the debtor and if the KERP is a transaction outside the
ordinary course of business. Precedent makes it clear that employees that exert sufficient control
over the debtor are insiders and any KERP payments made to those employees must overcome
the high hurdles imposed by section 503(c)(1). A debtor seeking to make payments to employees
who lack such power will only have to meet the more lenient section 503(c)(3) requirements,
provided that the KERP is a transaction outside the ordinary course of business.
DISCUSSION
I.

Which employees are insiders according to 11 U.S.C. §101(31)(B)

Prior to determining whether a KERP will be approved, the court must first determine
whether the employees receiving the payments are insiders. If the recipient of the KERP
payment is an insider, the analysis proceeds under section 503(c)(1). Section 503(c)(1) says that
there shall be no transfers “made to, or an obligation incurred for the benefit of, an insider of the

3

Id.
In re Borders Grp., 453 B.R. 459, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 369 B.R.
778, 784-85 (Bankr. D.Del. 2007)).
5 In re Global Home Prods., LLC., 369 B.R. 778, 785 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
4
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debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business” unless the
three requirements of section 503(c)(1) are met. The three requirements are:
(1) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention of the person
because the individual has a bona fide job offer from another
business at the same or greater rate of compensation; (2) the services
provided by the person are essential to the survival of the business;
and (3) either– the amount of the transfer made to, or obligation
incurred for the benefit of, the person is not greater than an amount
equal to 10 times the amount of the mean transfer or obligation of a
similar kind given to nonmanagement employees for any purpose
during the calendar year in which the transfer is made or the
obligation is incurred; or if no such similar transfers were made to,
or obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such nonmanagement
employees during such calendar year, the amount of the transfer or
obligation is not greater than an amount equal to 25 percent of the
amount of any similar transfer or obligation made to or incurred for
the benefit of such insider for any purpose during the calendar year
before the year in which such transfer is made or obligation is
incurred.6
Section 101(31)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a corporate insider as a: (i) director
of the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; (iv) partnership in
which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general partner of the debtor; or (vi) relative of a
general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor. 7 This list is not exhaustive. 8
The Bankruptcy Code does not define the terms “director” or “officer.” 9 When analyzing the
employee’s status as an insider, “title is insufficient to establish that an individual is a director or
an officer.”10

6

11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1).
11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B).
8 See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC., 138 S.Ct 960, 963 (2018).
9 In re LSC Commc’ns., Inc., 631 B.R. 818, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
10 Id. (quoting In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
7
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Courts have applied varying standards to determine an employee’s status as an insider.
Courts have regularly relied on dictionary definitions to control the analysis. For example, in
Borders, the court noted that the Tenth Circuit in Kunz had defined “director” using Webster's
Third International Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary. 11 The Tenth Circuit noted that
“[w]hen the term “director” is used in reference to a corporation, as it is used in the statutory
definition of ‘insider,’ the term plainly means a person who is a member of the governing board
of the corporation and participates in corporate governance.” 12 When approached with the task of
defining the term “officer,” courts have also used Black’s Law Dictionary to define officer as a
“person elected or appointed by the board of directors to manage the daily operations of a
corporation, such as the CEO, president, secretary, or treasurer.” 13
Additionally, courts have defined “officer” by analyzing both state and federal law.14. In
Fieldstone, the Maryland District Court analyzed the Clayton Antitrust Act, the Model Business
Corporation Act, and the Maryland Code to determine that “board appointment or election is
frequently identified as distinguishing ‘officer’ positions from other titled positions within a
corporation.”15 The Fieldstone Court went on to note that board appointment or election
ordinarily signals that the employee is an officer as a matter of law. 16
While the court in Fieldstone analyzed state and federal law to support its definition of
“officer,” state law has often been rejected as the sole source of the definition for “officer” under

11

In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. at 459.
In re Kunz, 489 F.3d 1072, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007).
13 Office of the U.S. Trustee v. Fieldstone Mortg. Co., No. 08–755, 2008 WL 4826291, at *3 n. 12 (D. Md. Nov.5,
2008) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (9th ed. 2009)).
14 Id. at *3.
15 Id. at *4.
16 Id. at *13–14.
12
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section 101(31)(B).17 In NMI Sys., the bankruptcy court for the District of Columbia rejected the
notion that state law was the sole source for the definition of “officer,” but considered the state
law definition as one factor in its analysis.18
Courts have also conducted a case-by-case, fact specific inquiry to determine the status of
the employee at issue. For example, courts have looked at corporate documents to determine that
an employee was not an insider. 19 In Public Access Tech., the bankruptcy court for the Eastern
District of Virigina was faced with deciding whether an employee holding the title “Executive
Vice President” was an insider. 20 The court concluded that the Executive Vice President was not
an insider because there were no corporate minutes, articles of incorporation, affidavits, or other
documents to support that the employee was an insider.21
One feature that courts have predominantly focused on when determining whether an
employee is an insider is the level of control over the debtor.22 In Borders, the Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York applied a control test to the employees at issue who all
held director-level titles.23 These employees, however, did not have any authority to implement
company policies.24 In addition, these employees did not report to the board of directors and
instead had to either report to an officer or another employee that reported directly to an

17

See In re NMI Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 357, 371 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995).
Id.
19 See In re Public Access Tech.Com, Inc., 307 B.R. 500, 506 (Bankr. E.D.V.A. 2004).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See In re Babcock Dairy Co., 70 B.R. 657, 661, (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (finding that insiders will have the
ability to exert sufficient control over the debtor or will be able to “dictate corporate policy and the disposition of
corporate assets”).
23 See In re Borders Grp., 453 B.R. 459, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
24 Id.
18
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officer.25 It is important to note that while the control test has been widely adopted, some courts
have rejected its application. 26 In LSC, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
rejected the Bankruptcy Court’s application of the control test for six employees that had been
appointed by LSC’s board.27 The LSC Court relied on the employees’ appointment by the board
to determine that they were insiders who were ineligible to receive the KERP payments. 28
II.

Meeting the Stringent Requirements of Section 503(c)(1).

When a court finds that the employee receiving a KERP payment is an insider according
to section 101(31)(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “stringent” requirements of section 503(c)(1)
are used to analyze whether the KERP can be approved.29 The debtor must prove all three
requirements of section 503(c)(1) before any KERP payments can be made to the debtor’s
insiders.
Under the first requirement, the debtor must show that absent the KERP payments, the
insider employee will leave their employment with the debtor because the employee has received
a “firm, good faith offer to work for a different employer for at least the same or greater
compensation.”30 To evaluate whether the first requirement has been met, the court must
determine:
(1) the employee's intention to leave unless the KERP is approved;
(2) whether the employee's reason for leaving is because the
employee received a valid offer of employment from someone other

25

Id.
See In re LSC Commun’s, 631 B.R. 818, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
27 Id. at 825.
28 Id.
29 In re Fieldstone Mortgage Co., 427 B.R. at 362.
30 Id. at 363.
26
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than the debtor; and (3) whether the offer was at least as valuable or
more valuable than that proposed by the KERP.31
The Fieldstone Court determined that a competing job offer was lacking because the company
that offered the position was the company conducting the takeover of the debtor. 32 Because the
debtor failed to meet its obligation under section 503(c)(1)(A), the KERP payment was denied. 33
The Court was satisfied that the requirement of section 503(c)(1)(B) had been met based on the
testimony of the debtor’s CEO.34 While the third requirement of section 503(c)(1) is objective,
section 503(c)(1)(B) is a subjective standard and imposes a heavy burden on the debtor. Under
section 503(c)(1)(B), the debtor must show that the retention of the employee is critical to the
success of the business.
III.

When is a KERP “a transaction in the ordinary course of business”

If an employee is not an insider according to section 101(31)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code,
the next step is to determine whether the KERP is a transaction in the ordinary course of
business. This is an important step because if the employee is not an insider under section
101(31)(B) and the KERP is a transaction “outside the ordinary course of business,” the debtor
must meet the requirements of section 503(c)(3). 35
Courts use a two-step horizontal and vertical test to determine whether a transaction is in
the ordinary course of business.36 The horizontal and vertical test “considers the reasonableness

31

Id.
Id.
33 Id. at 364.
34 Id.
35 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3).
36 In re Dana Corp., 358 B.R. 567, 580 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
32
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of the transaction from an industry-wide perspective and from the viewpoint of a creditor.” 37
Under the horizontal inquiry, the question is “whether, from an industry-wide perspective, the
transaction is of the sort commonly undertaken by companies in that industry.” 38 The vertical
inquiry analyzes the transaction from a hypothetical creditor’s point of view.39 The question of
the vertical inquiry is “whether the transaction subjects a creditor to economic risk of a nature
different from those he accepted when he decided to extend credit.” 40
Under the horizontal prong of the test, courts have looked to industry-practice, comparing
the plan to plans that other companies have implemented. 41 Under the vertical prong, courts have
considered whether the plan was a part of the debtor’s prepetition practice. 42 If the court
concludes that the KERP is a transaction outside the ordinary course of business, the KERP must
be analyzed under section 503(c)(3).
IV.
Applying Section 503(c)(3) to KERP Payments Outside the Ordinary
Course of Business Made to Non-Insiders.
After finding that the employee is not a corporate insider and that the transaction is
outside the ordinary course of business, the court turns to the language to section 503(c)(3) to
approve the KERP payment. Section 503(c)(3) provides:
notwithstanding section (b), there shall neither be allowed, nor paid:
other transfers or obligations that are outside the ordinary course of
business and not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case,
including transfers made to, or obligations incurred for the benefit

37

Id.
Id. (quoting In re Crystal Apparel, Inc., 207 B.R. 406, 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting In re Crystal Apparel, Inc., 207 B.R. at 409).
41 See In re Nellson Neutraceuticals, Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 798 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007).
42 In re Dana Corp., 358 B.R. at 582.
38
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of, officers, managers, or consultants hired after the date of the filing
of the petition.43
The facts and circumstances standard is the same standard as the sound business judgment test
used in section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code for approving transactions in the ordinary course of
business.44 To assess whether a corporation exercised sound business judgment, courts have
considered at least six factors, including:
1. Is there a reasonable relationship between the plan proposed and the results to be
obtained, i.e., will the key employee stay for as long as it takes for the debtor to
reorganize or market its assets, or, in the case of a performance incentive, is the plan
calculated to achieve the desired performance?
2. Is the cost of the plan reasonable in the context of the debtor's assets, liabilities and
earning potential?
3. Is the scope of the plan fair and reasonable; does it apply to all employees; does it
discriminate unfairly?
4. Is the plan or proposal consistent with industry standards?
5. What were the due diligence efforts of the debtor in investigating the need for a plan;
analyzing which key employees need to be incentivized; what is available; what is
generally applicable in a particular industry?
6. Did the debtor receive independent counsel in performing due diligence and in creating
and authorizing the incentive compensation?45
In re Residential Capital, LLC., is illustrative in its application of the Dana II factors to a
KERP.46 The court found that there was a reasonable relationship between the KERP and the
results since the payments would ensure that key employees remained with the debtor and the
debtor would incur significant losses if those employees left. 47 Next, the cost of the KERP was
reasonable because the total cost of the KERP fell below the median cost of KERP implemented

43

11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3).
In re Dana Corp (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 576–77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
45 Id.
46 491 B.R. 73, 85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
47 Id.
44
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by other chapter 11 debtors.48 The scope of the KERP was fair and reasonable since the KERP
applied to all remaining employees who would be staying with the debtor for longer than five
months.49 The debtor satisfied the final two factors by receiving independent counsel in the
creation of the KERP “to ensure that the payments are fair and consistent with industry standards
for a company operating under bankruptcy protection.”50 The court approved the KERP.51

CONCLUSION
When devising a Key Employee Retention Plan, debtors must assure that they are careful
in crafting their plan. A company should be aware that title alone is not sufficient to deem an
employee a statutory insider, but it becomes increasingly likely that an employee who exerts
sufficient control over corporate policy will be deemed an insider. Should an employee set to
receive a KERP be found an insider, the KERP will need to survive all of the strict requirements
set forth in section 503(c)(1). If the KERP is a transaction made outside the ordinary course of
business to a non-insider, the company must comply with the more lenient business judgment
test.

48

Id.
Id. at 86.
50 Id.
51 Id.
49
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